Discussion Paper

Author: Judith Eydmann   Student # 070559

November 2008

The Wisdom of Repugnance by Leon Kass

This paper originally appeared in the book “Life, Liberty and the Defense of Dignity” by conservative bioethicist Leon Kass. It focuses on human cloning but also explores human genome manipulation both of which Kass strongly opposes.

He opens the chapter with some cautionary points and suggests that sometimes we're enchanted by science and shouldn't accept technologies simply because they are new and may make life better. However, it does not necessarily follow on as Kass suggests that ‘we have lost our awe and wonder before the deep mysteries of nature and of life'. Awe of the natural world and appreciation of technology aren't mutually exclusive. Kass goes on to set the scene for his main discussion by highlighting what he sees as moral myopia in the arena of science, bioethics and public policy.

The crux of Kass' case against cloning is that whilst revulsion is not an argument, in crucial cases, repugnance is the emotional expression of deep wisdom. It ‘revolts against the excess of human wilfulness' and warns us not to transgress what is ‘unspeakably profound'.  Kass admits that other ‘repugnant' practices are now commonly acceptable but doesn't confront the problem this raises for his argument. He doesn't give specific examples but transplants may fall into this category. A limb transplant may provoke a sense of revulsion, yet aware of the lack of logic behind our unease, we push the feeling aside and the likelihood of repugnance being evidence of some indefinable wisdom falters.

Kass argues that “thanks to our belief that all children should be wanted… sooner or later only those children who fulfil our wants will be fully acceptable” (Kass 1998, p9). This assertion simply uses language to give the impression that there is a causal link between children being ‘wanted' and children fulfilling particular wants; this is a non-sequitur for which Kass offers no supporting argument .

Repugnance at human cloning is not universal in the same way that repugnance at incest, violation of the deceased and the other examples held up by Kass [almost] are. Reproductive cloning is opposed by a majority but therapeutic cloning is widely supported 1 . If repugnance at cloning is the emotional expression of wisdom, these figures suggest over half the population are bereft of that wisdom or the emotional capacity to express it and it's difficult to believe that the population is so defective.

Another objection from Nussbaum (2004) is that disgust is ‘linked to a general shrinking from the bodily nature of human life and hence to various forms of prejudice, exclusion, and misogyny, as people project the discomfort they feel about mortality and decay onto vulnerable groups and individuals' (Nussbaum 2004). Repugnance has historically been used to justify persecution so rather than blindly accept it as being indicative of wisdom, we should view it with some suspicion.

Kass' notion that ethics has a basis in emotion has been expounded by several philosophers, most notably Hume ([1739] 2000). One criticism of the Hume is that if morality is rooted in sentiment, how can there be any absolute, universal set of morals? Won't every individual simply have their own morality based on their own emotional fingerprint? Hume refutes this by claiming that behind each rational being's morality lies a deeper universal morality based in concepts such as justice (Hume [1739] 2000, III.II § 1). However, since a significant proportion of the population don't find the idea of therapeutic cloning 'repugnant' there is no universality of deeper morals behind the sentiment in this particular case.

Kass could be defended by examining the weakness in Kant's view that morals can be established through pure reason alone (Kant [1775] 1889, preface). One objection to Kantian ethics is that the emphasis on humans as rational beings is inadequate and the role of human emotion in morality is underestimated. However, when Kant uses the term ‘‘rational'' he means the opposite of empirical, not the opposite of emotional (Kant [1775] 1889 I § 2.2) and doesn't jettison emotion. And whilst there are other weaknesses, because so much bioethics is framed within a Kantian paradigm, Kass' theory has gained notoriety for its lack of reasoning.

Kass' theory would hold more weight had he referred to and defended the naturalistic morality found in Hume and others' work. Kaebnick (2008) has attempted to defend and expand Kass' position precisely this way. He aims to show "that considering emotions integral to moral judgments is philosophically respectable." He achieves this by defending Hume and concludes that "it is not that morality is silly or unimportant, but only that logic and empirical investigation alone cannot generate moral judgments." (Kaebnick 2008).

Kass goes on to argue that whilst ‘the heart has its reasons that reason cannot entirely know' (Kass 1998, p24) this wisdom can at least be partially articulated. When attempting this, Kass' argument appeals to nature because he claims that natural reproduction is a good over unnatural technologies. The appeal to nature fails because the definition of natural is debatable - the constituent nucleic acids in the genome of a genetically modified organism are as natural as those found in a non-modified organism. Even if the ‘natural' were definable here, it is still a fallacy of relevance since the argument of unnaturalness may hold but doesn't address the fundamental question of why that unnaturalness is wrong.

By attempting to define a ‘good' by appeal to some natural property, Kass succumbs to the naturalistic fallacy as proposed by G.E. Moore ([1903] 2008). Moore argued that it is a mistake to assume that if we name various properties of things which we believe to be good, we are actually defining ‘good.' (Moore [1903] 2008 I § 10.1-3) Moore argues that 'Naturalism' does not provide any logical reason for any ethical principle, because it falsely assumes that good has been defined. Recognizing that good cannot be defined, we realize that we must find logical reasons for ethical principles (Moore [1903] 2008 IV § 13).

In conclusion, whilst Kass makes some good points about the caution required with new technologies, his argument appeals to emotion and nature and has no bulwark against the naturalistic fallacy. Considering Hume and other philosophers, it may be that both emotion and reason can form the basis of ethics but by failing to develop the reasoning behind this tradition, Kass isn't convincing. Kass' lack of rigorous analysis leaves the impression that he thinks morality is nothing more than irrational expression of feeling.

             (Word Count: 1067)

Notes

1.  A public opinion poll on behalf of the Coalition for the Advancement of Medical Research (CAMR). The poll asked the opinion of 1,012 adult Americans on 23-Mar 2003. Of those sampled, 67% favour the continuation of therapeutic cloning research. Detailed results were: 55% want reproductive cloning banned but allow therapeutic cloning; 30% want a ban on therapeutic and reproductive cloning; 12% want no ban on either form of cloning; 3% were undecided.

Bibliography

Hume, D. ( 2000) Treatise on Human Nature. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (eds.), Oxford , Clarendon Press, ( references are to this edition by book , part and section number).

Kaebnick, G. (2008) Reasons of the Heart : Emotion , Rationality, and the ‘Wisdom of Repugnance '. Hastings Center Report 38, no. 4: 36-45.

Kant, I. ( 1889) Critique of Practical Reason and Other Works on the Theory of Ethic . trans. Thomas Kingsmill Abbott, 4th revised ed. Kongmans, Green and Co., 1889 ( references are to this edition by book , section and sub-section number).

Kass, L. (1998) The Wisdom of Repugnance. in Kass, L. & Wilson, J. The Ethics of Human Cloning Washington DC : American Enterprise Institute, pp.3-59.

Moore, G. (2008) Principia Ethica. [1903] Cambridge University Press; 12 Jan 2008 ( references are to this edition by chapter and section number).

Nussbaum, M. (2004) Danger to Human Dignity: The Revival of Disgust and Shame in the Law. The Chronicle of Higher Education . Volume 50, Issue 48, P B6.